1 Introduction
Recent financial scandals including the Madoff's case of felony or the distortion of budget figures by the Greek government, raise questions about the manipulability of information. In this article we study this issue in a principal-agent setup, in which the agent is given the possibility to influence the principal's evaluation of his work by manipulating certain pieces of information through the use of influence activities that distort the principal's evaluation of his performance if the principal engages in supervision. 1 Examples in that direction include an agent who invites his boss for a coffee or an agent who dresses or behaves in a particular way to make his supervisor feel he is more professional.
We assume that these activities have a cost for the agent and are aimed to manipulate the behavioral signal collected by the principal. This way of modeling influence is related to the work of Mullainathan, Schwartzstein and Shleiffer (2008) who consider the idea of associative thinking. In their framework, individuals classify situations into categories, and transfer the informational content of a given signal from situations in a category where it is useful to those where it is not. 2 Applying this concept to our model, the principal who dedicates time to monitor the agent will find it difficult to distinguish the following positive pieces of information "The agent is a hard-working (good) employee" and "The agent is a good person". These pieces of information belong to two different categories, work abilities and personality, and the difficulty for the principal is to disentangle signals that concern the contribution of their employee to the firm and the ones that relate to personal characteristics. Specifically, we model influence as a reduced form of coarse thinking by considering that the principal suffers from biased information processingà la Bénabou and Tirole (2002) .
As a result, the principal may misperceive a negative behavioral signal about the level of effort of the agent as being positive.
A comprehensive analysis of the manipulability of information requires a precise understanding of the relation between the concepts of hard and soft information. In the finance literature, hard information is defined as being quantitative (Berger et al., 2001; Stein, 2002; Petersen, 2004; Liberti and Mian, 2009 ). Hard information is assumed to be easy to store, to be transmitted in impersonal ways and to be independent of the collection process; all these features making it a priori difficult for hard information to be manipulated.
Further, research on supervision and delegation in principal-agent models refer to hard information as being verifiable (Tirole, 1986) whereas soft information is considered to be unverifiable (Baliga, 1999 ; Faure-Grimaud, Laffont and Martimort, 2003) . In these models, a signal is unverifiable whenever it cannot be observed by a third party (the "judge"). Manipulability of information implies that soft information can be distorted whereas hard information can simply be hidden.
In the current article, we consider a principal-agent model, in which the principal has access to both, hard and soft information about the agent's level of effort. We assume that hard information cannot be manipulated whereas soft information is subject to manipulation attempts. In our framework, agents do not distort or hide their own pieces of information but undertake influence activities in order to manipulate the soft signal collected by the principal. 2 Persuasion has also been modeled using an informational approach (Milgrom and Roberts, 1986; Dewatripont and Tirole, 1999 3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59  60  61  62  63  64  65 The consideration of both hard and soft signals relates our study to the literature on subjective evaluations (Baker, Gibbons and Murphy, 1994; MacLeod, 2003 ). In our model, similarly to the analysis developed in Baker, Gibbons and Murphy (1994) , the principal can propose contingent contracts that depend on a hard signal (determined by the level of production) as well as on a soft (behavioral) signal, which provides additional information about the level of effort of the agent. However, in contrast with the model of Baker, Gibbons and Murphy (1994) and the general framework of MacLeod (2003) , we assume that both the principal and the agent agree on the value of the soft signal so that the signal can be treated as if it were verifiable. As a result, we can disentangle the issues related to the unverifiability of subjective evaluations (MacLeod, 2003) from the issues related to the manipulability of such evaluations.
The costs and benefits of influence activities
Influence activities have been identified as actions completed by organizational members in order to bias the decisions of managers toward more pay and promotions (Milgrom, 1988; Milgrom and Roberts, 1988, 1992) . 3 As a general principle, this analysis suggests that influence costs can be reduced by limiting the discretion of decision makers for those decisions that have a significant impact on the distribution of rents inside the organizations but that have minor impact on the firm's profits. 4 In our model, we focus on optimal contracts rather than organizational design as a mechanism to reduce influence costs. In our framework, influence costs are not only incurred by the agent. Influence activities may also entail costs in terms of the firm's productive activities as is suggested in the original definition of Milgrom (1988) .
"That time of course is valuable; if it were not wasted in influence activities, it could be used for directly productive activities or simply consumed as leisure."
We assume that influence activities are unverifiable so that the principal cannot prevent influence simply by punishing manipulation attempts. In our model, influence activities tend to reduce aggregate welfare by increasing information asymmetry between principal and agent. As a result, the agent's ability to manipulate the soft signal increases the cost of implementing the high level of effort in equilibrium.
Our approach differs from the model developed by Maggi and Rodríguez-Clare (1995) in which agents can distort the principal's private information in order to reduce information asymmetry. In their setting, information distortion may actually allow for the falsification of information in equilibrium, and as a result, may increase aggregate welfare. Relatedly, Croker and Morgan (1998) study sharecropping and insurance optimal contracts showing that falsification is pervasive in equilibrium. In their setup, the agent who possesses private information about the contractible outcome (e.g., the size of the crop or the value of a loss) will misreport it in equilibrium given that the optimal contract provides overinsurance for small losses and underinsurance for severe ones. Misreporting in a principal-agent setting has also been studied in contexts in which the result of the privately observed information is affected by the agent undertaking a hidden action (Crocker and Slemrod, 2007; Crocker and Gresik, 2011; Beyer, Guttman and Marinovic, 2012;  Roger, 2012). 5
Incentive Schemes under Influence
In our setting, the principal will decide upon the optimal incentive scheme by comparing influence contracts that tolerate some influence activities in equilibrium and influence-free contracts that eliminate all manipulation attempts. In our framework, there exists conditions, which critically depend on the magnitude of influence costs, under which influence-free contracts are dominated by contracts that permit some degree of influence. The main difference between our work and the previous literature on information manipulation Gresik, 2011; Beyer, Guttman and Marinovic, 2012; Royer, 2012) is that influence activities are modeled differently from falsification. In falsification models, an agent observes a piece of information privately which he can choose to manipulate or not at a personal cost. In our influence model, the agent does not have any private information regarding the behavioral signal which he may attempt to influence. As a result, the application of the revelation principle to our setting is trivial.
We show that the cost of implementing the efficient equilibrium increases as the behavioral signal becomes more manipulable and influence activities are more pervasive. This occurs because in the presence of influence activities the principal relies on less informative signals and must, as a result, increase the variance of wages in order to keep incentives intact. This implies that a larger rent will have to be paid to the risk-averse agent in order to ensure that the participation constraint holds. This result follows from Kim (1995) after showing that the efficiency of the information structure decreases in the manipulability of the behavioral signal.
We show that optimal wages become more compressed and less volatile as the behavioral signal becomes 5 The results in these papers differ from Lacker and Weinberg (1989) , who characterize the optimal contract that induces no-manipulation in equilibrium. As is discussed by Croker and Morgan (1998), a correct application of the revelation principle implies that the contract in Lacker and Weinberg (1989) will be dominated by one that allows for falsification. 3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59  60  61  62  63  64  65 more manipulable. In addition, more weight is given to the hard signal in the payment scheme in the presence of highly manipulable behavioral signals. These results are closely related to the sufficient statistic theorem (Holmström, 1979; Banker and Datar, 1989) according to which incentive contracts must include all the signals that are informative about the agent's level of effort. Indeed, incentive schemes will be less responsive to the behavioral signal as it becomes more manipulable (and therefore less informative). 6 Interestingly, our model of influence does not necessarily lead to low-powered incentives. The fact that engaging in influence activities affects the agent's productivity negatively is crucial in understanding why our model may induce high-powered incentives. Indeed, the principal who designs influence-free contracts in equilibrium follows the strategy that consists of increasing the opportunity cost associated with influence activities by increasing the incentives associated with the hard signal. In that case, influence activities become less attractive as they reduce the probability that the agent will get the high payment associated with a high level of performance on the hard signal. As a result, the principal may be willing to design high-powered incentive contracts to deter influence activities. More specifically, we show that high-powered incentives and influence-free contracts are more likely to be offered to high-productivity agents for which influence is especially costly in terms of firm productivity than to low-productivity agents. Also, we show that the incentive contracts of high-productivity agents tend to be more responsive to the hard signal compared with low-productivity agents. 7 Finally, we show that the principal may decide not to supervise the agent in equilibrium, even though the cost of supervision is arbitrarily low. Supervising the agent to collect an additional informative signal is crucial for the principal's ability to implement the high level of effort. However, when the principal's bias is severe, it may become too costly for the principal to use the supervision signal to induce the agent to exert high effort. This is the case because a high level of manipulability of the supervision signal undermines its informativeness significantly forcing the principal to increase wages to sustain the high level of effort. In that case, the principal may simply decide to change her strategy ceasing to supervise and incentivize the agent even in a context in which the cost of supervision is arbitrarily low.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We present our model in Section 2 and study influence and influence-free contracts in Section 3. The analysis of the supervision decision is developed in Section 4. We conclude in Section 5. All proofs are available in the appendix.
The Model

Description of Actions and Payoffs
We consider a principal-agent model with three stages described as follows.
• In Stage 1, the principal [she] sets a contract w that will be used to pay the agent [he] in the last stage of the game. The contract is contingent on the level of production in the organization y ∈ Y := {0, 1}, which yields revenues R(y) for the principal, where R(0) < R(1) ≤R. This level of production is a hard and non-manipulable signal of the agent's level of effort.
In Stage 1, the principal also decides whether to engage in supervising the agent (s = 1) or not (s = 0) in order to obtain the additional signal (v) about the agent's level of effort. 8 The contract can be made contingent on this supervision signal v ∈ V := {B, G} which costs φ s ≥ 0 to the principal and which is collected in Stage 3. This piece of information can be interpreted as a behavioral signal about the employee's performance where B means: the agent is a lazy (bad) employee and G means: the agent is a hard-working (good) employee.
• In Stage 2, the agent decides whether to exert a high level of effort (e = e H ) or a low level of effort (e = e L ) on a productive task, where e H > e L . The level of effort (e) exerted by the agent on the productive task affects the level of production in the organization (y). The cost of effort on the productive task is denoted by φ (e) ≥ 0. We denote φ e := φ (e H ) > 0 and without loss of generality assume that φ (e L ) = 0.
In Stage 2, the agent also decides whether to undertake an influence activity (a = 1) or not (a = 0).
The personal cost for the agent of undertaking influence activities is denoted by φ(a) ≥ 0, where φ a := φ (1) > 0 and φ (0) = 0. We refer to φ a as private influence costs in the remainder of the paper.
The objective of the influence activity is to affect the evaluation of the principal with regard to the agent's actual level of effort by distorting the principal's perception (v s ) of the supervision signal (v). Our model builds on the idea that if the principal engages in supervision in Stage 1 and the agent undertakes influence activities then she will not necessarily observe the true value of the supervision signal v. Instead, the principal will observe v s which refers to the principal's, possibly erroneous, perception of the true signal. We describe the influence process in detail in Section 2.2.
• In Stage 3, the principal cannot observe the level of effort on the productive task. However, the principal observes the level of production as well as the behavioral signal if the principal decided to supervise the agent. The principal then pays the agent according to the contract chosen in Stage 1. It is assumed that the supervision signal when there is no influence from the agent (i.e. v s := v) satisfies
where the precision of the behavioral signal is denoted by ρ v ∈ 1 2 , 1 . We assume that if the agent does not undertake the influence activity, then the level of output (y) satisfies the condition that P [y = 0 | e = e L ] = P [y = 1 | e = e H ] = ρ y , where the precision of the hard signal is denoted by ρ y ∈ 1 2 , 1 .
The final payoff for the principal is determined as follows. The final payoff for the risk-averse agent is determined as follows.
We then denote w yvs ∈ R the wage that is paid to the agent contingently on receiving signals y and v s .
We set the agent's outside optionū = 0.
Assumptions
First recall that the principal does not directly observe the level of effort of the agent on the productive task, e ∈ {e L , e H } but she receives a hard signal on the level of effort by observing output (y). The principal may obtain an additional signal about the performance of her subordinate by engaging in supervision activities at a cost. We assume that the supervisor's perception of the behavioral signal (v s ) can be manipulated by influence activities (a). We model the influence of the agent on his supervisor's assessments as a case of biased attribution (Bénabou and Tirole, 2002) in which the principal may mistakenly perceive a negative signal about her employee as being positive as a result of influence activities. This biased attribution process can be related to the concept of transference for which the characteristic of an agent as a person is associated 9 We assume that the utility of the agent is separable in effort and in the influence cost as is the case for example in MacLeod (2003).  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59  60  61  62  63  64  65 with his quality as an employee even though in our context "being a good person" is not informative about "being a good employee" (Mullainathan, Schwartzstein and Schleiffer, 2008). 10 In the following assumption, we refer to π ∈ [0, 1] as the bias of the principal. In line with Bénabou and Tirole (2002) , we consider that the principal and the agent are fully aware of the bias of the principal. We state these assumptions as follows.
Assumption I (The influence process)
If the agent decides to undertake an influence activity in Stage 2 ( a = 1), then the principal will perceive with probability π ∈ [0, 1] any behavioral signal as if it were good.
With probability (1 − π) the principal uses standard Bayesian updating.
The bias of the principal π ∈ [0, 1] captures the difficulty of the supervisor to disentangle positive influence behaviors (a = 1) from positive behavioral signals (v = G). Clearly the existence of this bias creates incentives for the agent to manipulate the behavioral signal through influence activities. Since the principal is aware of her own biases, she knows that perceiving her employee positively (v s = G) may not systematically imply that the behavioral signal was positive given that, with probability π, the principal being under the influence of the agent (a = 1) always perceives the behavioral signal positively.
In our model, influence activities are assumed to be costly for the organization as they detract workers from their productive task (Milgrom, 1988; Milgrom and Roberts, 1992) . Influence activities are timeconsuming and undermine the quality of the work of the agent. This productivity-based influence cost translates into the following assumption in which influence activities reduce the probability that the agent obtains the high level of output for a given level of effort. We refer to productivity-based influence costs as influence costs in the remainder of the paper.
Assumption C (Influence costs and the value of the firm)
If the agent decides to undertake an influence activity ( a = 1), then P [y = 1 | e = e H ] =
One important feature of our model concerns the contractibility of the influence activity. We clarify this point in Assumption O.
Assumption O (Observability of actions and signals)
i) The supervision signal v s is observable by both the agent and the principal.
ii) The influence activity ( a ∈ {0, 1}) is not observed by the supervisor. 10 We can also think of trust and positive reciprocity as important factors in explaining the supervisor's biased perception of the performance of the agent in the presence of influence activities (see Hosmer, 1995 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59  60  61  62  63 64 65
The first part of Assumption O implies that both the principal and the agent agree on the value of signal v s so that the supervision signal can be treated as if it were verifiable (see MacLeod, 2003) . This is the case if we assume that a third party can design a mechanism that would punish the agent and the principal if they do not reveal the same value of the soft signal v s . The second part of Assumption O implies that the influence activity is unverifiable by a third party so that the previously mentioned mechanism cannot be applied and incentive contracts cannot be made contingent on the influence activity. These features of our model allow us to disentangle the issues related to the fact that subjective evaluations are unverifiable (MacLeod, 2003) from the issues related to the manipulability of such evaluations.
Definitions and Properties of Contracts
Next we introduce notations and definitions that will be useful to characterize the contracts derived in
where w ∈ R 4 + , the contract designed by the principal in Stage 1 according to which the agent will be paid as a function of the hard and the behavioral signals.
The principal will implement the efficient level of effort e L or e H depending on the actual cost of inducing high effort. We denote byŵ ∈ R 4 + the contract that minimizes the cost for the principal of implementing the high level of effort. In Section 3, we characterize this contract in the presence of supervision by showing how wages are affected by an increase in a parameter κ (namely, the principal's bias π or the influence costs α). 11
Definition 1 (Respective weights of hard and soft signals)
We say that an increase in a parameter (κ) raises the weight that is assigned to the hard (behavioral)
In the following definition we assess the responsiveness of incentive contracts to hard and behavioral signals. In particular we state that the power of incentives associated with a contract increases in a given signal if the difference between wages following a low value of the signal and wages following a high value 11 Our signals satisfy the monotone likelihood ratio property so that the optimal contract is such thatŵ 1vs ≥ŵ 0vs for any vs ∈ {B, G} andŵ yG ≥ŵ yB for any y ∈ {0, 1}. For further details, see Corgnet and Rodriguez-Lara (2012), where we study in detail two special cases of the current model: rational supervision (π = 0) and private influence costs (π > 0, α = 0). In both setups, we characterize the optimal contract that implements the high level of effort in the presence as well as in the absence of supervision. Most of our results are in line with previous research such as Holmström (1979) , Lambert (1985) and Banker and Datar (1989) , showing that the weight assigned to a signal increases in its precision. In addition, we show that as signal precision decreases (as is the case for example when the behavioral signal is more manipulable), the cost of implementing the high level of effort decreases for the principal. 3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59  60  61  62  63  64  65 of the signal increases. In that respect our definition of the power of incentives is related to the concept of wage compression since a reduction in the power of incentives in both hard and behavioral signals implies wage compression.
Definition 2 (Wage compression and the power of incentives)
i) We say that the power of incentives increases (decreases) in the hard signal (y) with respect to parameter
ii) We say that the power of incentives increases (decreases) in the behavioral signal (v s ) with respect to the parameter (κ) whenever
3 Influence and Influence-free contracts
In this section, we characterize the properties of optimal incentive schemes by assuming that the principal is willing to supervise the agent and induce him to exert high effort in equilibrium. 12 The principal has two different options when designing such schemes. On the one hand, the principal can propose influence contracts for which she anticipates that, in equilibrium, agents will be willing to manipulate the behavioral signal. On the other hand, the principal can deter manipulation attempts by proposing influence-free contracts. We denoteŵ I ŵ F the wage vector that minimizes the cost of implementing the high level of effortŵ I P I ŵ F P F , where P I P F is the probability vector associated with the case in which the agent exerts a high level of effort on the productive task and the principal tolerates [does not tolerate] influence from the agent. 13 We will refer toŵ I andŵ F as the optimal influence and influence-free contracts, respectively.
The principal will design influence-free contracts instead of influence contracts in Stage 1 as long as the following condition is satisfied:
This condition states that it is optimal for the principal to design influence-free contracts as long as the cost of implementing an efficient equilibrium under influence-free contracts is lower than under influence contracts. The cost associated with the use of influence contracts consists of two parts: the reduction in the 12 We study the principal's decision to supervise the agent in Section 4, where we also discuss strategies inducing low effort in equilibrium. 13 For simplicity we assume that wages are row vectors and probabilities are column vectors so as to avoid the use of transposes .  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59  60  61  62  63  64  65 revenues of the firm due to destructive influence activities αρ y (R (1) − R(0)) and the payment of wages to the agent (w I P I ). It is important to illustrate why, in our context, influence-free contracts may be dominated by influence contracts implying that manipulation attempts can be observed in equilibrium. To that end, we consider the case in which influence activities are effective (0 < π < 1) but costless (α = φ a = 0). In that case, the agent will engage in influence activities as long as wages are higher when the principal collects a good behavioral signal rather than a bad one (i.e. w yG > w yB ). Consequently, influence-free contracts will be such that the behavioral signal is ignored by the principal (w yG = w yB ) and only the output signal can be used to infer the agent's level of effort. In the case of influence contracts, the principal can use both signals making the pay of the agent contingent on output as well as on the manipulated, though informative, behavioral signal. Note that the behavioral signal continues to be informative for the principal even in the presence of influence activities as long as π < 1. Following the result of Kim (1995) we conclude that influence-free contracts, which are based on less information, are more costly to implement for the principal than influence contracts in the current example.
Influence contracts
If the principal decides to supervise the agent in an efficient equilibrium that induces high effort, she can allow for the influence activity by choosing a contractŵ I = (ŵ I 1G ,ŵ I 1B ,ŵ I 0G ,ŵ I 0B ) that satisfies the condition that the agent will perform the influence activity. 14 
Proposition 1 (Influence contracts and power of incentives)
i) The optimal influence contract that implements the efficient level of effort is such that an increase in the principal's bias (π) or that a decrease in influence costs (α) raises the weight that is assigned to the hard signal.
ii) The optimal influence contract that implements the efficient level of effort is such that the power of incentives decreases in the behavioral signal (v s ) with respect to the principal's bias (π) whereas the power of incentives decreases in the hard signal with respect to influence costs (α).
iii) The principal's cost of implementing the efficient level of effort increases in the principal's bias (π) and in the influence costs (α).
This proposition shows that the principal is willing to use the hard signal more intensively relative to the behavioral signal as π increases since the accuracy of the behavioral signal decreases in the principal's bias. 14 We derive the condition under which the agent who is being supervised performs the influence activity in Lemma 1 in the appendix. We note that for costless influence activities (φ a = 0) the subset of optimal wages that satisfy the condition is non-empty. In general, there exists an upper bound for influence activities costs for which the condition is satisfied. 3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59  60  61  62  63  64  65 Interestingly, the proposition also shows that an increase in influence costs (α) tends to lower the weight that is assigned to the hard and non-manipulable signal (y). This is the case because the accuracy of a low level of output (y = 0) as a predictor of the level of effort of the agent decreases as α rises. Indeed, in the presence of influence costs, a low level of production can be attributed either to a low level of effort or to influence activities. This implies that a low output signal is interpreted less negatively in the presence of influence costs, that is ∂ŵ I 0vs ∂α > 0 for any v s ∈ {B, G}. 15 In the extreme case in which influence costs destroy the whole output (α = 1) the signal y = 0 is uninformative about the level of effort of the agent. As a result, the weight of the hard signal in the agent's wage will be reduced as influence costs increase. Also, applying Definition 2 we know that the power of incentives decreases in the hard signal with respect to α Finally, the proposition shows that the manipulability of the behavioral signal and the magnitude of influence costs tend to increase the principal's cost of implementing the efficient level of effort. This is the case because an increase in π reduces the precision of the behavioral signal while an increase in α reduces the precision of the hard signal. It follows that in the case of influence contracts, the more manipulable is the behavioral signal and the larger are the influence costs, the less effective is supervision as a disciplining device for the agent. This implies that a larger rent will have to be paid to the risk-averse agent in order to ensure that the participation constraint holds.
Our results suggest that the principal would be better-off in an organizational environment in which agents do not have the possibility to influence her assessments. For example, supervisors may limit communication with subordinates to avoid influence activities (Milgrom, 1988; Milgrom and Roberts, 1988) . They may also design an organizational structure that limits interpersonal relationships between employees at different levels of the hierarchy. This can be achieved by having employees at different layers of the hierarchy work at different locations as is the case in the increasingly popular virtual organizations. In that case, employees' supervision is performed through computer-mediated communication systems. 16 However, the quality of the supervision signal may be undermined in those cases (Jarvenpaa and Leidner, 1999) . The optimal strategy consists for the principal of finding the right balance between getting access to information about the agent's level of effort while avoiding influence activities. An alternative solution to deter influence activities is to design influence-free contracts. 15 Note that the informativeness of the hard signal y = 1 is not affected by α, that is 3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59  60  61  62  63  64  65 
Influence-free contracts
The principal needs not accept influence activities from the agent and may design influence-free contracts that deter manipulation attempts. In that case, the principal will supervise the agent but in such a way that the agent never conducts the influence activity. We denote byŵ F = (ŵ F 1G ,ŵ F 1B ,ŵ F 0G ,ŵ F 0B ) the optimal influence-free wage contract that induces a high level of effort in equilibrium in the case of influence costs.
In the following proposition we characterize the main properties of the optimal influence-free contractŵ F ,
.
Proposition 2 (Influence-free contracts and power of incentives)
i) The optimal influence-free contract that implements the efficient level of effort is such that either an increase in the principal's bias (π) or an increase in influence costs (α) raises the weight that is assigned to the hard signal.
ii) The optimal influence-free contract that implements the efficient level of effort is such that the power of incentives decreases in the behavioral signal (v s ) with respect to the principal's bias (π). In addition, for any α ≥ᾱ, the power of incentives increases in the hard signal with respect to influence costs (α). As a result, the variance of wages increases in influence costs (α).
iii) The principal's cost of implementing the efficient level of effort increases in the principal's bias (π) but decreases in the influence costs (α).
Similarly to the case of influence contracts, influence-free contracts are such that the weight assigned to behavioral signals decreases as the manipulability of the signal increases (π). Nonetheless, influence and influence-free contracts differ since an increase in influence costs (α) raises the weight that is assigned to the hard signal in the case of influence-free contracts (Proposition 2i) while the opposite is true in the case of influence contracts (Proposition 1i). The intuition for this result follows from the fact that, under influencefree contracts, the principal uses the hard signal to deter influence activities. The principal increases the opportunity cost of influence activities by increasing the incentives associated with the hard signal. In that case, influence activities become less profitable as they reduce the probability that the agent will get the high payment associated with a high level of performance on the hard signal. Consequently, the principal will increase the weight given to the hard signal so as to discourage influence activities (see Proposition 2i).
The second part of Proposition 2 follows from the fact that for any α ≥ᾱ the following comparative statics hold
∂α < 0. Applying Definition 2, we conclude that, for any α ≥ᾱ, the power of incentives increases in the hard signal with respect to α. Notice that the threshold (ᾱ) above which influence costs lead to an increase in the power of incentives increases in the principal's bias 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59  60  61  62  63 64 65 (π). This occurs because for high values of π we obtain that ∂ŵ F ∂α ≤ 0 in which case the power of incentives does not increase in the hard signal with regard to influence costs. For large values of π the principal's mind is more manipulable and influence activities are more appealing to agents. As a result, eliminating influence activities may require decreasing the pay associated with the good behavioral signal ( ∂ŵ F yG ∂α < 0 for any y ∈ {0, 1}) in addition to increasing the pay associated with a high level of output ( ∂ŵ F 1vs ∂α > 0 for any v s ∈ {B, G}). If the former effect dominates the latter then
The main implication of Proposition 2 is that influence-free contracts may significantly differ from influence contracts with regard to the weight given to hard and behavioral signals. This finding suggests that in the presence of influence costs workers with different levels of productivity may be offered different types of contracts. 17 We elaborate on this conjecture in the next proposition by showing that high-powered incentives and influence-free contracts are more likely to be offered to agents for which influence is especially costly in terms of firm productivity.
Proposition 3 If influence costs satisfy the condition that α ≥ᾱ, then the wages offered to low-productivity agents R (1) < R F >I are less responsive to the hard signal than they are for high-productivity agents
This result follows from condition (1) according to which high-productivity workers (R (1) ≥ R F >I ) will be offered influence-free contracts whereas low-productivity agents (R (1) < R F >I ) will be offered contracts under which it is optimal for the agents to influence the principal's perception of the behavioral signal. This result is in line with the main findings in Green (1998) that studies the impact of skills on wages. Green (1998) finds that computer skills (i.e., hard signals) are highly valued whereas communication skills (i.e., behavioral signals) have little impact on wages, so that workers at higher levels of the hierarchy receive wages that are more responsive to the hard signal than to behavioral signals. More generally, our findings suggest that top executives whose impact on firm value is supposedly high are more likely to be paid according to hard signals than employees at lower levels of the hierarchy.
Supervision Decision
A principal who suffers from cognitive bias in the perception of the behavioral signal (π > 0) may decide not to supervise the agent so as to avoid manipulation attempts. This may be beneficial for the firm when influence costs are particularly high. Arguably, the behavioral signal may include additional information 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59  60  61  62  63  64  65 on the agent level of effort that the principal may need in order to incentivate the agent to exert a high level of effort. This is the case because, with more information available, the principal is more likely to detect possible shirking behaviors of her subordinate. The decision of supervising the agent or not will be determined by comparing the informative value of the behavioral signal and its cost, which includes the influence costs (α) and the cost of acquiring the signal (φ s ). 18 Our main result in this section (Proposition 4) states that the principal may decide not to supervise the agent, even if the cost of collecting the behavioral signal is arbitrarily low.
To analyze whether supervision is optimal from the point of view of the principal, we will have to ensure that implementing the high level of effort in an equilibrium with supervision is preferred to implementing the low level of effort. That is, we will not assume as was the case in the previous section that the high level of effort is efficient. We establish conditions under which it is optimal for the principal to supervise the agent by describing the conditions under which each of the following four types of equilibria exist: N L ) The principal does not supervise the agent and the latter exerts low effort.
N H ) The principal does not supervise the agent and the latter exerts high effort.
F ) The principal supervises the agent and uses influence-free contracts to induce high effort.
I) The principal supervises the agent and uses influence contracts to induce high effort.
We compare all strategies inducing a high level of effort in equilibrium (N H , F and I) with the strategy in which the principal implements the low level of effort (N L ). That is, we derive individual rationality constraints for the principal in each of these three cases. Strategy N H , F and I are respectively preferred to the implementation of the low effort equilibrium (N L ) if the following conditions are satisfied: 19
We know from the previous section that the cost of implementing high effort increases in α in the case of influence contracts while it decreases in α in the case of influence-free contracts. This implies that 18 In order to leave aside the uninteresting case in which the principal supervises the agent without inducing high effort, we assume that supervision costs (φ s ) are strictly positive. 19 Condition (2I) holds as long as 2ρ y − 1 − αρ y ̸ = 0. 3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59  60  61  62  63 64 65 (1) in Section 3.1, we can represent graphically the equilibrium strategy that applies for a given set of values of R(1) and α. Note that ∂R F >I ∂α > 0 becausê w I P I is increasing in α whileŵ F P F is decreasing in α (Propositions 1iii and 2iii) . That is, influence-free contracts will be more likely to arise in equilibrium as influence costs increase (see Figure 1 below).
In Figure 1 , we represent the case in which the cost of supervision (φ s ) is arbitrarily low. We also consider the situation in which influence contracts are preferred to influence contracts for α = 0. This condition holds as long asŵ I P I <ŵ F P F which will be the case for example if influence activities do not entail private costs for the the agent (φ a = 0). If this condition does not hold, the only two possible equilibrium strategies will be either to supervise the agent using influence-free contracts or not to supervise the agent inducing a low level of effort in equilibrium.
Figure 1 around here
In the case in which supervision costs are high, the principal will not supervise the agent and will simply choose between inducing the agent to exert high effort (N H ) or not (N L ). The former strategy will be chosen whenever the gains from high effort (R(1)) are large enough.
In the following proposition we show that, even if supervision costs are arbitrarily low, the principal may decide to avoid supervision. Given that supervision costs are arbitrarily low, we are in the case illustrated in Figure 1 in which only three equilibrium strategies are possible: N L , F or I. In that context, let us consider the situation in which influence activities are absent because the principal is not manipulable (π = 0). In that case, we know that the principal will decide to supervise the agent since it is costless to do so and no influence activities will be initiated in equilibrium. Now consider an increase in the principal's bias. From
Propositions 1iii and 2iii, we know that the principal's cost of implementing the high level of effort increases in π so that the thresholds R F and R I also increase in π. This implies that for sufficiently high levels of the principal's bias none of conditions (2F ) and (2I) are likely to hold in which case the principal will prefer not to supervise the agent and induce him to exert low effort rather than supervising and incentivizing the agent.
We denote by π − the level of the principal's bias such that the principal is indifferent between supervising the agent and inducing him to exert high effort and not supervising the agent without incentivizing him.
Formally, π − is defined, as the level of bias such that:
Note that there always exists an interior solution π − ∈ (0, 1) for equation (3) . From the proofs of Proposition 1iii and 2iii (see appendix) we know that ∂ŵ F P F 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59  60  61  62  63  64  65 Also, lim ρ y →1 min R F , R I = φ s so that for φ s arbitrarily low we have: R(1) > lim ρ y →1 min R F , R I . As a result, for a given π − ∈ (0, 1), there exists ρ − y ∈ 1 2−α , 1 such that equation (3) is satisifed as long as
There exists a range of values α ∈ (0, α − ) for which this condition holds since lim
Proposition 4 Given ρ − y and α ∈ (0, α − ), the principal will not be willing to supervise the agent for any level of the bias above π − , even though the cost of supervision is arbitrarily low.
Supervising the agent to collect additional signals is crucial for the principal's ability to implement the high level of effort. In case the principal's bias increases, the precision of the behavioral signal obtained through supervision is undermined. This forces the principal to increase wages to compensate the agent for the increase in the variance of wages which follows from the use of a more noisy behavioral signal. If the principal's bias is particularly severe (above π − ), the principal may simply decide to change her strategy ceasing to supervise the agent and inducing him to exert low effort.
Conclusion
In this paper, we analyzed the design of incentive contracts in a principal-agent model in which the agent had the possibility to engage in influence activities and manipulate a behavioral signal which was collected by the principal in the supervision process. We found that an increase in the manipulability of the behavioral signal increases information asymmetry between the agent and the principal and increases the cost of implementing the efficient level of effort as a result. Also, we showed that an increase in the manipulability of the behavioral signal raises the weight assigned to the non-manipulable hard signal and decreases the power of incentives associated with the behavioral signal whether the principal designs influence or influence-free contracts.
Interestingly, we identified fundamental differences between influence and influence-free contracts regarding the effect of an increase in influence costs. In particular, the weight assigned to the hard signal decreases in the influence costs in the case of influence contracts while the opposite is true in the case of influence-free contracts. This result holds because the principal who designs influence-free contracts aims at deterring influence activities by increasing their opportunity cost which is achieved by raising the incentives associated with the hard signal. More specifically, we show that high-powered incentives and influence-free contracts are more likely to be assigned to agents for which influence is especially costly in terms of firm productivity. This result is in line with empirical findings in Green (1998) showing that workers at higher levels of the hierarchy 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59  60  61  62  63  64  65 receive wages that are more responsive to the computer-based hard signal than to the communication-based behavioral signal (see also Liberti and Mian 2009 ).
Finally, we showed that the principal may intentionally avoid supervising the agent when the manipulability of the behavioral signal is high. This result holds even if the cost of supervision is arbitrarily low. This is the case because inducing high effort may become unsustainable for the principal as the manipulability and thus the noisiness of the behavioral signal increases.
Although our model provides a generalization of the principal-agent model for the case in which some signals are manipulable, we deliberately abstract away from the interesting case of multi-agent frameworks.
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Proof of Lema 1. We denote w I = w I 1,G , w I 1,B , w I 0,G , w I 0,B the vector of contingent wages that characterize the influence contracts. We also denote P I 1 P I 0 the probability of receiving each of these payments when exerting a high [low] level of effort. In the case of influence contracts, the principal allows the agent to engage in influence activities, paying the wages w I with probability P I 1 .
If the agent does not undertake the influence activity, then the probability of receiving these wages is given by:
Therefore, the agent undertakes the influence activity if and only if
π((1−ρ y )+αρ y ) This condition states that the agent will undertake the influence activity as long as the benefits derived from increasing the probability of receiving a high pay w yG instead of getting a low pay w yB (where w yB < w yG for any y ∈ {0, 1}) are larger than the cost of the influence activity (φ a ). We can see in condition (IA) that as the quality of the hard signal ρ y rises, the incentives for the agent to undertake the influence activity decrease. This occurs because as ρ y increases, the distortion of the soft signal which is achieved through influence activities becomes less effective. For example, the soft signal will be ignored by the principal if the hard signal is perfectly accurate (ρ y = 1 and α = 0). Finally, notice that an increase in the principal's bias (π) facilitates influence activities as it lowers the right-hand side in condition (IA). The intuitive reasoning is that an increase in π raises the manipulability of the soft signal so that the probability with which influence activities turn a low pay (w yB ) into a high pay (w yG ) increases as well. 3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59  60  61  62  63  64  65 Proof of Proposition 1. We defined P I 1 above and
We can derive the optimal contract under influence (ŵ I ) which solves:
) and w I 0B = h(u 0B ) to ensure that the optimization program is concave (see Laffont and Martimort 2002) . Then, the first-order Kuhn-Tucker conditions are necessary and sufficient to determine the optimal influence contract.
We denote λ and µ the non-negative Lagrange multipliers associated respectively with the incentive compatibility (IC) constraint and the individual rationality (IR) constraint. 20 The optimal influence contract satisfies that:
In order to investigate the properties that are satisfied by the optimal influence contractŵ I = ŵ I 1G ,ŵ I 1B ,ŵ I 0G ,ŵ I 0B , we use the implicit function theorem in equations (1 1G ) , (1 1B ) , (1 0G ) and (1 0B ) . We obtain that, 20 We do not present the feasibility and Slackness conditions for simplicity. We find that in equilibrium µ > 0 and λ > 0 so 3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59  60  61  62  63  64  65 As a result, we conclude that the optimal influence contract that implements the efficient equilibrium satisfies the condition that an increase in either the principal's bias (π) or the productivity-based influence costs (α) raise the weight that is assigned to the hard signal (Proposition 1i). Using the implicit function theorem we can also conclude that the power of incentives decreases in the soft signal (v s ) with respect to the principal's bias (π) and the the power of incentives decreases in the hard signal (y) with respect to productivity-based influence costs (α) (Proposition 1ii). This is the case because To demonstrate part iii) of the proposition, we use the result established by Kim (1995) , showing that an information structure P is more efficient than an information structure Π if its likelihood ratio is a mean preserving spread of that of Π.
We compute the following function:
Where ρ j i stands for the precision of signal i ∈ {v, y} of information structure j ∈ {P, Π} and Π := P I denotes the probability vector under influence.
> 0. At the same time, we have that:
(1−(1−α)ρy)ρv ∂ρ v < 0. As a result, for any increase in the influence parameter from π − to π + the information structure P (ρ v ) is not as efficient as Π (π + , ρ v ) since then Φ > 0. In order to make Π (π + , ρ v ) as efficient as P we can consider the information structure
As a result any increase in π reduces the efficiency of the information structure Π.
These results show that an increase in the manipulability of the supervision signal reduces its informativeness implying that the cost of implementing the efficient equilibrium increases with the bias of the principal in the case of influence activities compared to the case of rational supervision. Also, an increase in the precision of the soft signal decreases the cost of implementing the efficient equilibrium more significantly in the case of rational supervision than in the case of influence. This is the case, since under influence an increase in the precision of the supervision signal is partially offset by the fact that it can be distorted by the subordinate. Finally, in the presence of influence activities an increase in the precision of the hard signal tends to compensate for the low accuracy of the soft signal. In the extreme case in which the hard signal is 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59  60  61  62  63  64  65 perfectly informative ρ y = 1 the principal can infer the level of effort of the agent whether the soft signal is manipulable or not.
The same reasoning applies with respect to the productivity-based influence costs α. In particular, an increase in α reduces the precision of the hard signal (y) leading to a less efficient information structure.
Using the result of Kim (1995) , this implies that an increase in α will increase the cost of implementing the high level of effort.
It is also the case that applying the same reasoning to the precision of the hard signal ρ y we can show that implement the high level of effort is less costly as ρ y increases. This is the case since:
the vector of contingent wages that characterize the influence contracts. We also denote P F 1 P F 0 the probability of receiving each of these payments when exerting a high [low] level of effort.
We need to solve the following optimization problem.
IF
We obtain the following first order conditions, where δ is the non-negative Lagrange multiplier associated with restriction IF. We can see that λ > 0, µ > 0 and δ > 0.
If we use the implicit function theorem in these equations we can see that:
0B )((ρ v −1)(π(1+ρ y (α−1))δ+λ−ρ v (αδ+λ))+µ(ρ v +ρ y −1)) 2 > 0 Similarly, we conclude after some algebraic manipulations that: 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59  60  61  62  63 64 65
Regarding the variance of wages (see Propositions 2ii) one can see the wage scheme as a mixed Bernoulli distribution with parameter ζ so that the variance of wages σ 2 (w) in that case is such that: σ 2 (w) =
] is the Bernoulli distribution that takes values w 1G and w 1B [w 0G and w 0B ] with probability ρ y and 1 − ρ y respectively. To show that σ 2 (w) increases in α we are left to demonstrate that ∂ ∂α [E(B G ) − E(B G )] ≥ 0, that is to show that ρ y (w 1G − w 1B )+ 1 − ρ y (w 0G − w 0B ) is increasing in α. We know that as α increases the (IF ) constraint is relaxed since costs of influence increase for the agent and at the same time the power of incentives in the hard signal increases in α as we have shown in the previous proposition. As a result, for (IF ) to be binding in equilibrium (it has to be the case since δ > 0) it has to be that the benefits associated with influence rise to compensate an increase in costs associated with the influence activity previously mentioned. That is, the power of incentives in the soft signal has to increase with regard to α. This implies that both (w 1G − w 1B ) and (w 0G − w 0B ) cannot decrease in α. This completes the proof that σ 2 (w) is increasing in α. Propositions 2i and 2ii follow directly from these results.
To demonstrate part iii) of the proposition note that assessing the principal's cost to implement the efficient level of effort in the case of influence-free contracts crucially hinges on the influence-free constraint (IF). Indeed, in the case of influence-free contracts neither π nor α affect the precision of the signals received by the principal in equilibrium. As a result, any effect π and α on the cost of implementing the efficient level of effort results from the effect of these parameters on the influence-free constraint. This is what we study next. Let us start by denoting IF = u w F P F 1 − P I 1 . Using simple algebra we can establish the following comparative statics for IF : ∂IF ∂α > 0 and ∂IF ∂π < 0. It follows from these comparative statics that an increase in α or decrease in π will facilitate the implementation of influence-free contracts and then lower the principal's cost of implementing the efficient level of effort.
We can also show using the result established in Kim (1995) which is used in the proof of Proposition 1iii that implementing the high level of effort is less costly as the precision of the hard signal ρ y increases.
Proof of Proposition 3. We know from the analysis of section 3.2 that it is optimal for the principal to design influence-free contracts as long as condition (1) is satisfied: αρ y (R (1) − R(0)) +ŵ I P I ≥ŵ F P F . Also, we know from Propositions 1iii and 2iii thatŵ I P I is increasing in α whileŵ F P F is decreasing in α. As a result, ∂R F >I ∂α > 0 where R F >I :=ŵ F P F −ŵ I P I αρ y + R(0). We conclude that there exists a threshold 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59  60  61  62  63  64  65 for the principal's revenues when output is high R F >I above which influence-free contracts are preferred to influence contracts. This threshold decreases in α. It follows that there exists a level of productivity above which high-productivity agents for which R(1) ≥ R F >I will face an influence-free contract whereas low-productivity agents (R(1) < R F >I ) get an influence contract.
Proof of Proposition 4. Main text. 
